Defining Baseline Sales in a Competitive Environment by Blattberg, Robert C. et al.
Seoul Journal of Bnsiness 
Volume 2 Number 1 
Defining Baseline Sales 
In a Competitiw Environment 
Robert C. Blattberg 
Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University 
Byung-Do Kim 
College of Business Administration, Seoul National University 
Jianming Ye 
Graduate School of Business, 'Ihe U n i d t y  of Chicago 
Abstract 
The baseline ("normal" sales) has become the most commonly used pro- 
cedure to measure the incremental effect of marketing variables, particu- 
larly promotions. Firms such as IRI and Nielsen provide their clients with 
baseline sales' estimates which they then use to determine the sales and 
profit effects of consumer and trade promotions and, in some cases, measure 
their brand equity. With the increasing importance of the baseline to the 
measurement of marketing effects, it is necessary to develop an accurate 
definition of the baseline and determine what it measures. This paper will 
define baseline sales and discuss its implications, show that the incorpor- 
ation of competitive reaction is important to the definition of the baseline 
and discuss how to use this concept when a firm has a broad product line. In 
addition, we compare several baseline estimation methods using simulated 
data and show the importance of incorporating a competitive reaction 
component in baseline estimation. Finally, we apply the concept of competi- 
tive reaction to actual sales data and show that the baseline computed with- 
out a competitive reaction hnction is ~ i g ~ c a n t l y  different from the base- 
line with a competitive reaction hnction. 
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As firms are under greater pressure to demonstrate the economic return 
from marketing expenditures, the need for a new measurement standard has 
emerged. In the last five years, in part through Information Resources (IRI) 
and Nielsen, consumer product firms have begun using the baseline as a 
critical measurement tool. By studying whether marketing expenditures gen- 
erate sales above the baseline, management evaluates whether its various 
marketing tactics are generating increases in sales and profitability. Part of 
the emerging prominence of the baseline is that market share has become a 
fbnction of numerous marketing activities and is no longer a "clean* 
measure of a brand or product's strength in the market place. Brand or 
product managers can increase market share through aggressive 
promotional programs which may not pay out economically. The rapid 
growth of promotional spending in the last decade has also focused firms on 
the "baselinen so that they can decide what "normal" sales are in the ab- 
sence of highly aggressive short-term marketing spending. 
The concept of a baseline is not new. In the late 50's and early 60's stoch- 
astic models (Herniter and Magee, 1961; Maffai, 1960) used Markov chains to 
predict normal sales in order to measure the impact of a change in the firm's 
marketing tactics. Kuehn and Rohloff [I9671 used the linear learning model 
to estimate normal (baseline) sales in the absence of promotions and then 
used them to analyze promotional effects. One of the reasons that these 
baseline did not gain prominence earlier was their inability to control for 
marketing factors during the base period. It was not until the advent of 
scanner data and related models which adjusted for promotional effects1' 
that the ability to measure the baseline, holding fmed other factors, became 
feasible 
Research that has focused on the baseline is not prevalent Abraham and 
Lodish [I9871 used a time-series model to estimate the baseline in the ab- 
sence of promotional activities. Taking advantage of the idiosyncracies of 
1) For example, see Guadagni and Little (1983) who incorporated promotional factors into stochastic 
brand choice models and Blattberg and Wisniewski (1989) who estimated promotion effects for 
store level scanner data 
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store-level data, Abraham and Lodish [1990, 19931 have improved their pre- 
vious approach in various areas such as smoothing techniques, bias correc- 
tion mechanism, etc. Numerous other models implicitly try to estimate in- 
cremental marketing effects above normal sales (i. e., Chintagunta, Jain, 
and Vilcassim, 1991) but the literature does not define "normal sales" and no 
attempt has been made to consider issues associated with def&g and 
measuring the baseline. Given its current widespread use among 
package-goods manufacturers and its impact on marketing measurement, it 
is surprising more articles have not focused directly on this issue. 
The purpose of our paper is to define baseline sales and discuss its 
implications, showing that the incorporation of competitive reaction is im- 
portant in the estimation of baseline. The paper is organized as follows. Sec- 
tion 2 gives alternative definitions of the baseline: Section 3 shows, through 
a game-theoretic discussion, the importance of the competitive reaction (or 
its expectation) to the estimation of the baseline and discusses how a prod- 
uct manager having a broad product line can use our definition of the base- 
line: Section 4 uses a simulation to compare several baseline estimation 
methodologies, showing that the incorporation of competitive reaction is 
critical under certain market condition: Section 5 applies the concept of 
competitive reaction to store level data for three product categories, fol- 
lowed by the Section 6 which contains the future research direction, sum- 
mary and the conclusions of the paper. 
TI. DEFINITION OF THE BASELINE 
In defining the baseline we will draw parallels to the experimental design 
literature. The concept of a baseline is similar to a "control". A control is 
used in an experiment because it attempts to hold fured all other factors. We 
will refer to the baseline as a "quasi-control" because the baseline uses stat- 
istical procedures to hold some factors fured and to remove others, and 
hence, it is really a conditional control, with variables being set at fmed 
levels. This leads to the following definition. 
The baseline is an estimate of sales ;If& controlling for andlm 
mmving the effects of speczyic marketzetzng actiuities. 
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The baseline is designed to measure "basen sales in the absence of 
short-term marketing expenditures. It has been normal to rernove promo- 
tional effects from sales but rarely to control fm other marketing activities 
(such as regular price and media advertising) or competitive factors primar- 
ily because most baseline analyses are focused on measuring the impact of 
promotions. Our definition concentrates on both removing short-term mar- 
keting activities and on controlling other relevant marketing mix variables 
and competitive behavior. Generally, when a marketing activity is remwued 
from the baseline, its level is set equal to zero. When a marketing activity or 
marketing mix variable is controlled for, its level is not set equal to zero but 
to the appropriate level given the time period being analyzed. For example, 
it does not make sense to set an item's regular price equal to zero (i. e. re- 
move it) but rather to set it equal to the level at the time the baseline is be- 
ing used to analyze the incremental effect of a given marketing activity. 
It is always difficult to decide what to remove from the baseline. Gener- 
ally, the rule regarding what to remove from the baseline appears to be 
marketing activities that its effect is only "short-termn and hence can be re- 
moved. Examples of these activities are: 
Retailer's temporary price reductions 
Coupons 
Special short-term purchase incentives 
Display and feature advertising 
Post or pre promotion troughs 
Marketing activities which should be controlled for are those which are 
required to market the product and those which have a "long-termn effect. 
Examples of these activities are: 
Media advertising 
Regular shelf price 
New item introductions 
Product deletion decisions 
Changes in distribution 
Competitive behavior 
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No doubt there are numerous other marketing activities that could be in- 
cluded in this list, and, if important, should be controlled for or removed 
depending on whether their effect is short-term. 
In deriving the baseline, key factors are held constant through statistical 
analysis. This is similar to the use of covariates or concomitant variables 
(Scheffe [1959]) in the analysis of variance. The reason covariates are in- 
cluded and an analysis of covariance is used is the main effects in the model 
are affected by them. Scheffe ([1959], p. 195) states, "The analysis of covari- 
ance was introduced ....as a device for simulating control factors not possible 
or feasible to control in an experiment." Since it is dmcult to use controlled 
experiments in the real world, baselines are usually estimated from sales 
data directly. 
To better understand the concept of a baseline, it is usehl to begin with a 
simple model: 
where Sjt is the unit sales for brand j at time t, RPjt is the regular price 
for brand j at time t, and DDEPTHjt is the depth of deal discount for brand j 
at time t. Our goal is to analyze promotional effect on sales (e.g., incremen- 
tal volume) so that the d e f ~ t i o n  of the baseline is very important. What is 
the baseline for brand j from the demand hnction specified in equation (2. 
I)? Since the baseline is the sales without its own promotions (e.g., setting 
DDEPTHjt to be zero), a possible candidate is: 
where Bjt is the baseline of brand j at  time t. The controversial issue is 
whether to use the observed historical DDEPTHkt in computing the baseline 
of brand j. This depends upon what the decision maker believes is endogen- 
ous and exogenous. If one believes that competitor's promotions are exogen- 
ous, then it should be part of the controlled environment. If not, the histori- 
cal DDEPTHkt should not be used. Otherwise the baseline will be biased. 
For example, if competitors always match the promotion of the brand, 
DDEPTHkt of zero (e.g., if the firm does not promote, competitors will not 
promote) should be used in computing the baseline of brand j. 
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The above discussion illustrates that the definition of the baseline is com- 
plex. The definition of a control in an experiment is equally complex be- 
cause one always assumes certain key factors are being held constant. We 
call the baseline a "quasi-control" because to hold fixed other factors, stat- 
istical models are used. 
In determining which specific marketing activities to try to remove or con- 
trol for, it is similar to the discussion that occurs when an econometric 
model is being built and the modeler must decide which terms belong in the 
model and which belong in the error term. By not including a variable in the 
model, one is assuming its effect is small and uncorrelated with the variables 
in the model. Hence, the criterion for not controlling for or removing a given 
marketing variable should be: "the marketing activity which has no (or very 
little) effect on the baseline. " 
In this section, we will explain why the incorporation of competitive reac- 
tion is important in baseline estimation, mathematically define baseline sales 
in a competitive environment mathematically, suggest different baselines for 
different situations and discuss an important application of this concept to 
intra-brand competition. 
3.1 Introduction 
One of the most important issues that needs to be addressed in deterrnin- 
ing the baseline is the decision whether to incorporate competitive reaction 
into it. Many of the current procedures, such as time series analysis, do not 
directly include competitive reaction into the baseline because it is assumed 
"constant". For example, Abraham and Lodish [I9931 define the baseline as: 
"The baseline is an estimate for each store week of what the sales of 
the item would have been had only the item's promotion not been run. 
All other elements of the item's and the competitor's marketing mix are 
assumed cet& paribas. " 
SEOUL JOURNAL OF BUSLNESS 7 
In other words, Abraham and Lodish are making an explicit assumption 
about competitive reaction-there is none. They treat the competitive 
promotions as exogenous so that the baseline of brand j which has the de- 
mand hnction of equation (2.1) can be expressed by equation (22). 
Abraham and Lodish argue that the usefulness of their baseline is to 
analyze specific promotional events for a subset of "stakeholders", the sales 
force and the executional members of the marketing organization When 
they analyze a promotional event, the effect being studied is the difference 
between sales and the baseline. 
where Sit is the sales of item j at time t, Bit is the baseline for item j at 
time t, and Ejt is a random error with mean zero. The promotional effect is yj 
DDEPTHjt. Implicitly they argue their stakeholders are more interested in 
understanding qt than yjDDEPTHjt because they want to understand the suc- 
cess or failure of a given promotional execution. Their argument is that the 
team implementing promotions is not interested in the mean promotional re- 
sponse but in the increase over that mean because they design executional 
strategies for a general promotion. This translates into concentrating on 
using baseline to study Ejt. This view of a baseline is clearly "short-run" and 
focuses on analyzing a specific promotional event. 
The focus of our paper will be broader and will concentrate on analyzing 
the dynamic nature of the baseline. Specifically, we will analyze how actions 
taken by the firm in one week can affect the actions of their competitors and 
how this influences the accuracy of the baseline. For example, for the model 
given in (2.1) above, the issue we will address is the exogeneity of the 
promotional activity in the market. If it is not exogenous, then when one 
estimates the baseline, one must understand that the firm's promotional ac- 
tion influences competitors' actions. 
Using Abraham and Lodish's terminology, our approach to baselines will 
be useful for certain stakeholders such as the brand managers, planners in 
trade marketing, and strategists in the field organization. Abraham and 
Lodish's focus is the front-line sales force and executional specialists within 
the marketing function. Our approach to estimating baselines incorporates 
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competitive response which is very important in planning annual or even 
quarterly promotional frequency and depth. By not incorporating compe- 
tition into the estimation of the baseline, it would appear that promotions 
(and potentially other marketing actions) are more profitable than they 
actual are because most of the sales increases are caused by stealing 
customers from competition. If the firm and competition reduced 
promotional spending, profits would increase and sales would not decline 
significantly because customers would still buy in the category. Most current 
baseline procedures do not consider the endogeneity of competitive 
promotions, and hence, they overestimate the incremental impact of the 
firm's historical promotional events on its sales. 
The remainder of this section will show how the inclusion or exclusion of a 
competitive promotion affects the height of the baseline and hence the in- 
cremental effect of promotional activity. 
3.2. Game Themetic V i m  of the Baseline 
For simplicity, it is assumed that there are two brands, brand 1 and 2, in 
the category and we are interested in estimating the baseline of brand 1. 
The demand (or sales) of brand 1, S1, is expressed as 
where Dj (j=1,2) is the depth of deal discount for brand j and z is a vector 
of variables (e.g., regular price of brand j) which affects the demand of 
brand 1 and should be included in the baseline itself. It is assumed that a 
SI / aDl>O and as1 / aD2<0. 
What should the baseline be under the above demand specification? We in- 
troduce two definitions of the baseline sales of brand 1, the "competitive re- 
action function" and "no competitive reaction f'unction" baseline, in order to 
show the importance of incorporating competitive reactions. 
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where slNCR is the "no competitive reaction fhnction" baseline sales of 
brand 1 and stR is the "competitive reaction fhnction" baseline sales of 
brand 1. Notice that the "no competitive reaction function" baseline in 
equation (3.2a) implicitly assum that the promotion of brand 2 does not i$lu- 
ence the promotion of brand 2. It assumes a Nash behavior such that aD2/ a 
Dl=O. In contrast, the "competitive reaction function" baseline in equation 
(3.2b) assumes a leader-follower relationship such that brand 2 will not pro- 
mote its brand if brand 1 does not promote. We can generalize this notion of 
the "competitive reaction fbnction" baseline by incorporating the reaction 
ftxnction of brand 2 to the depth of deal discount for brand 1. For example, 
D2 = g(D2). Rewriting equation (3.1), the demand fhnction of brand 1 can be 
written as 
With this demand specification, the baseline sales of brand 1 can be de- 
fined as 
Notice that the baseline sales computed from the equation (3.4) will be 
higher than that from the equation (3.2a) if ag(D1) / aD1>O while it will be 
lower if ag(D1) / aD1<O. In other words, if brand 1 stops promoting its 
brand, brand 2 decreases its discount depth if ag(D1) /aD1>0 so that the 
baseline from the equation (3.4) becomes greater than slNCR since dS1 / aD2<0 
(e.g., the decrease of discount for brand 2 increases the demand of brand).2) 
Under this circumstances, therefore, if we include the reaction of the com- 
petitor (or competitors), the magnitude of the incremental volume induced 
by a promotion will be reduced because of the higher baseline sales. If firm 
2) As a concrete example, suppose S1=u+/?Dl+yDz where D>O. and $0. If the depth of discount for 
brand 2 is determined independently of the discount of brand 1, the baseline sales of brand 1 (e.g., 
no competitive reaction hc t ion  baseline) is u+yDz. Now, assume the discount of brand 2 is deter- 
mined by the reaction function, D2=Sl+S2Dl, where 62>O. Then, the baseline of brand 1 becomes 
larger since D2 decreases when promotion for brand 1 is stopped and this decrease in the discount 
depth for brand 2 increases the baseline sales of brand 1. 
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1 reduces its promotional activity, brand 2 will reduce its promotional ac- 
tivity. This implies that the incentive to promote a brand is less than when 
we incorporate the effect of the competitor's reaction. 
If our assumption about the competitive behavior is ag(D1) / aD1=O, then 
the baseline from the equation (3.4) becomes equivalent to "no competitive 
reaction functionw baseline from the equation (3.2a). If the competitive reac- 
tion function is likely to be ag(D1) / aD1<O, which means that if the discount 
of brand 1 is increased, brand 2 will increase its discount even more, then 
the estimated baseline will be lower than the "no competitive reaction func- 
tion" baseline from the equation (3.2a). Thus, if firm 1 reduces its promo- 
tional activity, firm 2 will iwease its promotional activity. 
By defining the baseline to be equation (3.4), we quickly see that the as- 
sumption we make about the reaction function is critical. 
3.3 Intra-Brand Competition 
The above baseline concept, which incorporates competitive reaction, is 
useful for a manufacturer which has a broad product line with multiple items 
and/ or other brands. The 'group productw manager is more concerned 
about the total profits of all brands rather than the profit for each item. Dif- 
ferent from the inter-brand competition case, the group product manager 
knows or is able to control the reaction functions of the other items in the 
product line. Unless there is no cannibalization among the brands or items 
within a brand, the baseline sales of a given brand will change with the 
profitability of the promotions of each brands in the product line because of 
the argument given in the previous section. Therefore, in order to compute 
the profitability of a given promotion for a specific brand or item within the 
product line, it is important to compute baseline sales for each brand as- 
suming the firm's other items do not promote. 
As an example, assume a firm with two brands, brands A and B, wants to 
compute the incremental sales of brand A. Assume that the sales of brand A 
is determined by the following equation: 
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where DDEPTH* and DDEPTHB~~ are the depth of deal discounts of brand 
A and B during week t respectively. Further, assume that the firm 
alternates the promotions of its brands every week with brand A being 
promoted in weeks 1,3,5, ... and brand B being promoted in weeks 2,4,6, ... 
The depth of the discount is $1.00 (e.g., DDEPTH&= $1.00 if the brand is 
promoted and DDEPTH*=O if not). The sales of brand A is 200 units when 
it is not promoted because brand B is promoted during that week and it 
becomes 1,000 units when it is promoted. When we compute the profitability 
of the promotion, we should & use 800 units, 1,000 units minus 200 units, as 
the incremental sales of brand A from the promotion since the sale of 200 
units of brand A includes the promotion of brand B. The incremental sales is 
upwardly biased since the baseline used is downwardly biased. Notice the 
"true" baseline is 300 units which is computed by assuming neither brand A 
and nor brand B promote. For the correct computation of the profitability of 
a given brand's promotion, we must use the baseline of the brand when the 
other brands (or items) in the product line do not promote. 
N. COMPARISON OF BASEJ3NE ESTlMATION ME'IHODS 
In this section, we propose eight baseline estimation methodologies. Some 
methods are chosen because of their simplicity and support from previous 
Literature while some are proposed on the basis of our intuition regarding 
potential candidates for baseline estimation. Because the true baseline is not 
known for "real data", we will use a simulation to evaluate the methods so 
that the true baseline is known. The performance of eight estimation 
methods are compared under 8 (e.g., 2  x 2 x 2  design factors) different mar- 
ket conditions which vary in terms of (1) whether the price promotion of a 
brand increases the sales of the category by a large amount or not, (2) 
whether the category is highly promoted or not, and (3) whether 
competitors make independent promotional decisions or not. These three 
aspects of market conditions will be explained in more detail later. 
Once the data is generated through a simulation for a given market con- 
dition, each baseline estimation method will be compared on two perform- 
ance criteria: mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) and bias. These are 
SEOUL JOURNAL OF BUSINESS 
computed by: 
where T is the total time period of the data, Truet is the true baseline for 
week t and Estimt is the estimated baseline for week t from a given esti- 
mation model. Bias is considered since we want to study whether an esti- 
mation method overestimates or underestimates the true baseline, on aver- 
age, over the entire simulation period. 
4.1. Simulation 
We assume a hypothetical market where there are three firms in the prod- 
uct category. Each firm produces one brand: firm i produces brand i (i=1,2, 
3). We will focus on the baseline of brand 1 since the results for other brands 
are similar. The role of the retailer is ignored since our concern is the base- 
line of a brand. The incorporation of multiple retailers significantly 
increases the complexity of the simulation (e.g., we should consider con- 
sumer store choice decision as well as behavior of retailers) while it does not 
provide additional insight of our paper. 3' 
In the simulation 5,000 consumers were created who are heterogeneous in 
terms of their reservation prices, brand loyalties, price sensitivities, and 
mean purchase rates. For each week, consumers are assumed to make three 
purchase decisions, not necessarily sequential: (1) whether to buy the 
category, (2) which brand to buy, and (3) how much to buy. Chiang (1991) 
and Chintagunta (1993) have shown that the simultaneous treatment of the 
above three purchase decisions is superior to the sequential treatment. Our 
simulation will use their approach. 
3) If multiple retailers are incorporated into the simulation, there are two ways to compute the base- 
line for each brand. First, one can compute the baseline with aggregated data (e.g., sum of the 
sales and weighted average price across stores) at the market level or calculate the baseline of a 
given brand for each store and sum them across stores to compute the baseline of each brand. The 
baseline estimation method proposed in the paper can handle both cases without much difficulty. 
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4.1.1. Category Buying and Brand Choice Decision 
For each week, the category buying decision of each consumer is assumed 
to be determined by the following equation. Consumer i's probability of buy- 
ing the category at week t is 
In the above equations, Ri is the reservation price of consumer i, INVit-1 is 
consumer i's inventory level for the category at week t-1, and pct is the price 
of brand j at week k. 
The brand choice decision for each consumer is similarly determined. The 
consumer i's probability of purchasing brand j at week t conditional on 
category purchase is 
Notice that each consumer is heterogeneous in all parameters in equation 
(4.1) and (4.2) above. The reservation price, Ri, determines whether the 
category is expandable or not. For example, if most of consumers in a mar- 
ket have extremely low reservation prices (e.g., RixO for all i) the price dis - 
count of a brand will not increase the category demand. For the simulated 
low category expansion market condition, Ri is assumed to be distributed as 
log-normal with mean of 0.01 and variance of 0.012~ across 5,000 households. 
For high category expansion, Ri is distributed as log-normal with mean of 
10 and variance of 0.04~. 
The inventory parameter, pi, characterizes whether consumer has enough 
inventory space in her house to stockpile. For example, a consumer whose pi 
is close to zero may have a large house so that he or she will stockpile the 
promoted brand. In the simulation, pi is assumed to be distributed as 
log-normal with mean of 0.5 and variance of 0.2~. Finally, consumers are also 
heterogeneous in terms of their brand preferences or loyalty. The distri- 
bution of aij will characterize this consumer specific loyalty pattern. We have 
assumed a market where there are three segments of consumers." 30 
4) Alternatively, we can assume more complicated continuous distribution (eg., three variate 
multivariate normal) for loyalty heterogeneity instead of the discrete distribution assumed here. 
We adopt the discrete distribution because of its simplicity and its popularity in marketing 
(Kamakura and Russell, 1989). 
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percents of consumers are assumed to be brand 1 loyal so that [ail, aiz, a l ~ ]  = 
[1,0, -11. Another 30 percents of consumers are brand 2 loyal so that [an, ~ i 2 ,  u 
a] = [0,1, -11. The remaining 40 percents are switchers so that [ail, an, an] = 
[~,O,OI* 
4.1.2. Quantity Decision 
Once the consumer chooses a brand, s / he decides on how many units to 
buy which is then determined using a truncated Poisson process. We use a 
"truncated" process because the quantity decision is made conditional on the 
brand choice decision. In our simulation, if a consumer makes a brand 
choice decision which is also conditional on the category buying decision, 
s /  he buys at least one unit. Consumer i's probability of purchasing x(i,j,t) 
units of brand j at week t can be written as: 
Prob[X(i,j,t)=x(i,j,t)]=l(i,j,t) x(w.~)  e-fi~j.t)  / x(i,j,t)! 
where l(i,j,t )=l(i) e~p(yINVu-~+Sp~) and x(i,j,t )=1,2, ... (4.3) 
Note that l(i) is consumer specific (time-invariant) mean purchase rate, 
INVit-l is consumer i's inventory level of the category at week t-1, pet is the 
price of brand j at week t 
In the simulation, we set the parameter value of y = -1.0 and d = -3.0 
which is constant across consumers and brands. However, consumers are 
heterogeneous in terms of their mean purchase rate, l( i) ,  which is assumed 
to be distributed as log-normal with mean of 10 and variance of 0.2. We 
have chosen the above parameter values based on whether the resulting 
mean purchase rate with and without promotions is reasonable. For 
example, the above parameter values implies that a household with mean A 
(i) will buy 1.5 units of a product on average when there is no promotion 
which means a few households will buy two or three units at the regular 
price. However, the same household will buy 2.1 units of a product on aver- 
age if there is a promotion. 
4.1.3. Inventory Equation and Consumption 
The inventory level at time t for consumer i is updated from the inventory 
level at time t-1 by adding the current purchase quantity and subtracting 
the current consumption quantity which implies IWit = IWit-I + sx(i , j , t )  
-c& where Cit is consumer i's consumption rate at time t and x(i,j,t) is her 
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quantity purchased of brand j at time t. It is assumed that the consumption 
rate is Cit = c when INVit-I + x(i,j,t)rc and tit = INVit-I + x(i,j,t) when 
INVit-I + x(i,j,t) < c which means that the consumer will consume c when 
the inventory at time t is above c but will only consume the available inven- 
tory level if c is less than the on-hand inventory. 
In the simulation, the initid inventory level is assumed to be zero for all 
consumers and c=0.2. However, because of the probabilistic nature of our 
simulation, the inventory level becomes heterogeneous across consumers. In 
the simulation, we generated 200 weekly sales observations (e.g, the time 
period t is week) for each consumer and dropped the first 100 weeks to 
stabilize the inventory level for each consumer and remove the effects of "in- 
itial" conditions. The brand's sales for each week is simply the summation of 
the individual brand purchases. 
4.1.4. Promotional Decision of Each Firm 
In addition to the high vs low category expansion conditions discussed 
above, we vary two other market conditions: (1) how frequently and how 
deep a temporary price reduction to offer, and (2) whether the promotional 
policy of competitors (brand 2 and 3) is independent of the promotional pol- 
icy of firm l. 
We did not use the different response parameters for temporary price 
change and permanent (regular) price change since the regular price is 
&ed in our simulation. Therefore, the price parameter in our simulation 
model can be interpreted as the response to the temporary price change. 
The regular prices of all brands are futed around $1.00. 
Firms are assumed to make two promotional decisions for each quarter in 
our simulation model : promotional frequency decision (e. g., how many 
weeks per quarter will price discounts be given?) and promotional depth de- 
cision (e.g., if a price discount is given, how much will be offered?). For 
packaged grocery products, a promotional calendar which is prepared quar- 
terly or annually is commonly used. At the beginning of each quarter, a firm 
makes promotional frequency and depth decisions which will not be changed 
in that quarter. 
A. Promotional Frequency and Depth: It is generally believed that it is 
very difficult to estimate baselines if promotions are run frequently. With 
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frequent promotions, there will be few data points which are not contami- 
nated with promotional effects. In order to see whether promotional fre- 
quency makes baseline estimation difficult, we used two promotion 
schedules, one high promotion frequency and the other low promotion fre- 
quency. For the high frequency condition, the (weekly) average promotional 
frequency of firm 1 is four a quarter (13 weeks) while for the low frequency 
condition, it is two a quarter. In the simulation, we determined the fre- 
quency of promotions for each quarter by generating the value from a 
Poisson distribution with a mean of 4 for the high frequency condition and 
with a mean of 2 for the low frequency conditions. Note that monthly 
promotions (about four promotions per quarter) are common for brands in 
heavily promoted categories. Similarly, the depth of promotional discount 
for each quarter is determined by generating the value from normal distri- 
bution with mean=0.25 and variance=0.05~. 
B. Competitive Reaction: We vary the promotional policy of firm. 2 and 3 
to see its effect on the baseline estimation. For the "independent" condition, 
firm 2 and 3 are assumed to make their quarterly promotional decisions in- 
dependent of firm 1. For example, under the high frequency condition, the 
promotional frequency of firm 2 and 3 is four a quarter on average (also 
generated by Poisson with mean of 4) independent of the promotional fre- 
quency of firm 1. Their promotional depth of discount is also determined in- 
dependent of the discount depth decision of firm 1. 
For the "reaction" condition, however, it is assumed that firms 2 and 3 ob- 
serve the promotional frequency and depth of firm 1 (both historical and 
current) and determine their promotional policy. We will use the following 
linear reaction function for promotional frequency and depth5'. 
5) Similar linear reaction functions have been widely used by political scientists (Axebod, 1984) and 
economists (Kalai and Stanford, 1985). In addition, some non-linear reaction functions (e.g., 
semi-log) were used to simulate the data while linear models were applied to estimate the reaction 
finction. The main results do not change. In order to estimate the baseline accurately, the incor- 
poration of competitive reaction is critical while the choice of functional form for the reaction func- 
tion is less critical. 
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where FREQck is the promotional frequency of firm c (c=2,3) in quarter k 
and ADEPTHck is the firm c's average depth of discount in quarter k eck is 
assumed to be distributed as normal with mean=O and variance=l and vck is 
normal with mean=O and variance=0.12. In the simulation reported, ucl and 
G~ are assumed to be 0 and and Bc2 are 1. With this specification of par- 
ameter values, we implicitly are assuming that competitors tend to match 
the promotional frequency and depth of firm 1 each quarter!' 
4. 2. Baseline Estimation Methods 
4.2.1. Time Series Based Methods 
A. Simple Mean (MEAN) : This method estimates the baseline by simply 
averaging the actual sales across time. This method will work well if a firm 
is a monopolistic firm and there is no category expansion caused by its 
promotions. Under this market condition, the additional sales made during 
promotional weeks comes entirely from future sales or stockpiling since 
there is neither category expansion (e.g., either consumption increase or ad- 
ditional consumers) nor brand substitution from a lowered price: that is, the 
additional sales (or stockpiling amount) made during the promotional period 
are exactly the same as the loss of sales af%er a promotion. 
B. Exponential Smoothing with All Data (EXPOA): The baseline is com- 
puted using a first-order exponential smoothing method applied to all data 
points. The baseline at time t is computed from EBt = uSt-l+(l-a)EBt-1 where 
St-I is the sales of time t-1, EBt is the estimated baseline at time t and a is a 
smoothing constant. The market condition under which this method per- 
forms well is similar to that of MEAN. For each application, the smoothing 
constant a is chosen to minimize E ~ ( E B ~ - S ~ ) ~  to estimate the baseline. 
C. Exponential Smoothing without Promotional Weeks (EXPON): The 
baseline is computed by exponentially smoothing the data after removing 
any weeks contaminated with the brand's (or item's) own promotions. The 
elimination of promotional weeks produces many missing data points which 
make the direct application of exponential smoothing impossible. Therefore, 
6) The main results did not change with different values of @I, Uc2, Bcl, ahd Bc~. 
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if the given week is the promoted week, its sales will be replaced by the 
mean sales of the previous non-promoted and the next non-promoted week. 
The first-order exponential smoothing method is applied to this modXed 
sales data. 
D. Variable Window Weighted Moving Average (VWWMA) : This method 
is a simplified version of the model (PROMOTER) suggested by Abraham 
and Lodish (1987).') This method computes the baseline by first eliminating 
the points contaminated with promotions and forming a centered window of 
width p (e.g., p=6 weeks) for the remaining data. The baseline sales for the 
given week is the mean for this window. Since the promoted weeks are 
eliminated from the data, the time period used to compute the mean for a 
given point will be longer than the width p. 
Conceptually, VWWMA and EXPON are similar in that both methods 
eliminate the data points contaminated with the item's own p~mt ion .  These 
methods will work well if competitors make independent pricing decisions or 
the additional sales from promotions come completely from category expan- 
sion. 
4.2.2. Regression Based Methods 
A. Ordinary Least Square (OLS).: The baseline of brand j at time t is 
computed by first fitting the following regression model to the data 
where Sjt is the unit sales of brand j at time t, RPt the regular shelf price 
of brand j at time t, and DDEPTHjt is brand j's depth of discount at time t. 
The baseline, by definition, is equal to aj+pjRPt by setting DDEPTHjt to be 
zero. Conceptually, OLS .is similar to EXPON and VWWMA because it 
eliminates the promotional weeks by setting DDEPTHjt to be zero. 
B. OLS with Lags of Deal Discounts (OLSL): The baseline is computed by 
7) The complete version of PROMOTOR is an iterative procedure which can handle various aspect of 
sales data such as trend and seasonality. However, VWWMA without iteration may approximate 
their procedure since our simulation data do not have trend and seasonality. 
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first fitting the regression model (4.6), and setting DDEPTH,t-, (r=0,1,2, ...) 
to be zero. 
The lagged deal discounts are added in this model since sales for the im- 
mediate periods after the promotional period can be contaminated when 
consumers stockpile the brand during the promotional period. One or two 
lags are applied since more than two lags are not significant for our simulat- 
ed data. However, the number of lags would be determined empirically. 
C. OLSL with Competitive Price Effects (OLSC): The baseline is 
computed by fitting the regression model (4.7), with setting DDEPTHjt-, 
(r=0,1,2, ... ) to be zero for the own deal discounts and plugging the observed 
DDEPTHkt for competitive deal discounts. 
This method appears more sensible than the previous methods because it 
incorporates competitive promotions in the model. Sales of the brand are 
influenced by competitive promotional activities as well as own promotions. 
D. OLSC with Competitive Reaction Function (OLSR): This model is the 
same as OLSC except that the competitive depth of discounts, DDEPTHkt 
(k=2,3), are replaced by the values calibrated from the reaction hc t i on  de- 
scribed below. In order to estimate the reaction equation for each brand, we 
first count the number of price promotion for each quarter and calculate the av- 
erage depth of discount (when there is a price reduction) in a given q~ar ter .~ '  
With the frequency of promotion and the average depth for each brand, the 
following regressions are applied for brand 2 and 3 (note that we are 
8 )  There are several studies available in estimating reaction fbnction (Lambin, Naert and Bultez, 
1975: Hanssens, 1980: Leeflang and Wittink, 1991). However, (weekly) cross correlation analysis 
proposed in these studies may not be appropriate to identify the pattern of competitive reaction 
among brands in frequently purchased grocery products. Our experience in this area indicates that 
we can observe quarterly frequency and depth reaction even though it is very difficult to see the 
weekly promotional reactions among brands. 
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interested in the baseline of brand 1) to identify the pattern of competitive 
reactions. 
FREQck=aci+/3clFREQik 
ADEPTIFk=ac2+BC~ADEPTHlk where c=2 and 3 
From the fitted reaction regression above, we can calculate the quarterly 
promotional frequency (acl) and average depth of discount (old) for firm c 
when firm 1 does not promote (i.e., FREQlk=O and ADEPTHlk=O). How- 
ever, we do not know the exact promotion schedule without the promotion of 
brand 1. We cannot determine which specific weeks firm c will offer the deal 
from the quarterly promotional frequency (acl). Therefore, we introduce a 
concept of expected DDEPTHck which will be computed by multiplying the 
weekly probability of deal (ac1/13) and the average depth of discount if 
dealt (ad). ') 
OLSR is different from OLSC in that it utilizes the pattern of competitive 
reaction. It calibrates the expected depth of discounts for competitive brands 
when the own brand, brand 1, does not promote. Therefore, if competitors 
make independent promotional decisions, OLSR becomes the same as 
OLSC. However, if competitors react to the promotional decision of our 
brand, the expected depth of discounts for competitive brands determined in 
the above equation will be different from DDEPTHkt so that these expected 
depth of discounts should be used in computing baseline sales of brand 1. 
Note that the baseline of a brand is the sales when the brand is not 
promoted. When the brand does not promote, competitors will react and 
hence the expected depth of discounts for competitive brands should be used 
to compute the baseline of brand 1. 
9) Alternatively, the promotion schedule can be simulated with the weekly probability of deal oc- 
curred of ucl / 13 and the depth of discount of w For each simulation, we generate one possible 
promotion schedule of firm 2 and firm 3, and estimate the baseline of firm 1. The final baseline can 
be calculated by averaging over the baselines computed from a number of simulated promoted 
schedule. This simulated procedure (100 simulations used) has produced very similar baseline to 
the baseline computed by the expected DDEPTHkt above. 
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4.3. Simulation Results 
As mentioned, eight baseline estimation methods are compared for 8 dif- 
ferent market conditions. Tables 1 and 2 show the performance of each 
method for each market assumption Moreover, Figure 1 to 4 show the 
actual sales of firm 1, corresponding true and estimated baselines for a 
subsample of various market conditions. Given the space limitation, we will 
report the estimation results for firm 1. The computation and result of the 
other firms are similar to those of firm 1. 
Comparing the high and low frequency promotion conditions, Tables 1 and 
2 show that all methods produce more accurate baselines when there are few 
promotions. Both the bias and MAPE are smaller. This result intuitively 
makes sense since more data are contaminated with promotions under the 
high frequency promotional condition resulting in less "normal periods* to 
estimate the baseline. At the extreme, when there are no promotions during 
the entire data period, the actual sales become the baseline. 
Second, all methods tend to work better when there is low category ex- 
pansion. In our simulation framework, promotions increase a brand's sales 
Table 1 
Performance of Each Estimation Method When Competitors Do Not React 
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Table 2 














High Category Expansion 
High Freq I Low Freq 
The top value (0.10) represents MAPE and the value on the bottom (0.10) 
represents Bias. 
through: (1) brand switching, (2) stockpiling, and (3) category expansion or 
additional new buyers. The ideal baseline estimation procedure would esti- 
mate these three effects separately so that it can compute the baselines cor- 
rectly. However, it is very difficult to separate these components with mar- 
ket-level aggregate data. Under the low category expansion condition, the 
baseline is easier to estimate since promotional sales increases come mainly 
from two sources (e.g., brand switching and stockpiling) instead of three. 
Third, OLSR tends to be the best estimation method under all 8 market 
conditions. The unique component of OLSR is its consideration of the com- 
petitor's reaction function. It uses the expected competitors' promotions 
given the promotional schedule of firm 1. Note also that when competitors 
make their promotional decisions independently, the performance sf OLSC 
is almost identical to that of OLSR. When firm 2 and 3 make their 
promotional decision independently, the expected competitive deal depth 
given no price discount of firm 1 is almost the same as the currently 
observed deal depth. 
Fourth, MEAN and EXPOA work well when there is low categmy expan- 
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sion and commtitors react. We have assumed a competitor's reaction hnction 
such that competitors tend to match the promotional frequency and depth of 
firm 1. Therefore, when firm 1 does not promote (baseline of firm I), the 
other firms tend to charge the regular price because of the above reaction 
function. This reaction function with no category expansion explains why 
MEAN and EXPOA performs well. The (cooperative) optimal strategy for 
all firms when there is no market expansion is to avoid promoting. When 
u competitors react, the average sales becomes constant because in the no 
category expansion" case, the average (across weeks) sales of firm 1 without 
any promotions is the same as its sales with promotion (also, see Figure 1). 
MEAN and EXPOA estimate the baseline with reasonable accuracy. In con- 
trast, when there is large category expansion with promotion and 
competitors do not react, these two methods become the worst. They do, 
however, help improve our intuition about how baselines change as market 
characteristics change. 
F a h ,  EXPON, VWWMA, OLS, and OLSL are conceptually similar to each 
other because they eliminate the data points contaminated with promotions. 
These methods does not work well for various market conditions. when com- 
petitors do not react. Notice that when competitors make their promotional 
decisions independent of the promotions of firm 1, they will continue to pro- 
mote even if firm 1 stops promoting. Therefore, when firm 1 promotes, its 
volume is incremental and traditional methods such as OLS capture the 
baseline. This intuitive explanation is codrmed by the result that these 
methods do not perform well when competitors react but do well when 
competitors do not react. 
Sixth, OLSC turns out to be the one of the worst methods when com- 
petitors react because it always underestimates the baseline. However, it 
works well when competitors do not react. OLSC assumes that competitors 
will not stop promoting even when brand 1 stops promoting. This suggests 
that when cmpetitors read, it is not recommended to include competitor's 
prices in the baseline estimation model unless the reaction function is also 
used. This is an interesting and surprising result. 
The overwhelming performance of OLSR over other methods described 
above can be seen more clearly on Figures 1 to 4. The figures show the cases 
in which promotional frequency is high while they differ in terms of two 
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Figure 1. Low Category Expansion and Reaction 
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Figure 2. High Category Expansion and Reaction 
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Figure 3. Low Category Expansion and No Reaction 
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Figure 4. High Category Expansion and No Reaction 
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market conditions, category expansion and the existence of competitive reac- 
tion, Figure 1 has two plots: the top represents simulated actual sales and 
the corresponding true baseline and the bottom shows the true baseline with 
estimated baselines from OLS, OLSR and VWWMA Notice that OLSR 
estimates the true baseline very accurately while other methods significantly 
underestimate it1'! Figure 2 shows the case in which the market is expanded 
and competitors react The results are similar to Figure 1. Notice that the 
sales during promotion is much higher than the previous figure. The ad- 
ditional sales during promotional period comes from category expansion as 
well as brand switching. Notice also OLSR approximates the true baseline 
reasonable well 
Figure 3 and 4 show the results when competitors do not react. Note that 
the true baseline itself is very volatile when competitors do not react. The 
ups and downs of the true baseline come from competitor's promotional ac- 
tivities. OLS misses these ups and downs causing high MAPE but low bias. 
However, both OLSC and OLSR recovers these ups and downs by including 
competitive variables in the estimation model. The performance of OLSC 
and OLSR is almost identical because there are no competitive reactions. 
Figure 4 hows similar results under high expansion condition. 
V. APPLICATION: COMPUTING STORE-IEVEL BASELINE LINES 
As shown in the simulation, one of the key issues in estimating baselines is 
the reaction h c t i o n  of competitors to a firm's promotional decision In this 
section, we will show there exist positive promotional reactions among 
competitors in a real market so that the baseline using methods without con- 
sidering competitive reactions (OLS or OLSL ) is significantly underestimat - 
ed. The data set to be analyzed has been supplied by Dominick's Finer Food 
Co., a major grocery chain in Chicago which owns more than 80 stores in 
metropolitan Chicago area. To simplify the reporting of the results, a sub- 
10) It is interesting to observe that VWWMA underestimates the true baseline for the entire period 
and the magnitude of bias is positively correlated with the frequency of promotions (e.g., 
VWWMA's very low baseline during the end of the data period with very fkequent promotions). 
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urban store is chosen for the analysis1''. Three product categories which 
cover 156 weeks will be studied; bathroom tissue, frozen orange juice, and 
refrigerated orange juice. 
5.1 Basetine for Bathroom Tissue 
There are four major brands for bathroom tissue category: Northern, 
Cottonelle, Charmin, and White Cloud. We focus our attention on Northern, 
the market leader. A simple method of estimating the baseline for Northern 
is OLS. The result of the estimation with standard errors in parenthesis is 
SNoR,t=212. 6+1925.1 DDEPTHNoR,~ 
(19.8) (157.9) 
Adj - ~ ~ = 0 . 5 1  
where is the unit sales of Northern in week t, DDEPTHNoR,~ is the 
depth of deal discount for Northern in week t Note that we did not include 
the regular price of Northern and the lagged values of discount depth since 
they are not significant. The OLS baseline of Northern is 212.6 for the entire 
period which is computed by setting DDEPTHN~R,~ to be zero. 
To determine the baseline of Northern using OLSR, the first step is to es- 
timate a model in which sales of Northern are related to the discount depths 
of other brands as well as Northern The estimation result is written as 
SNOR,t=246.4+1905.7 DDEPTHNoR,~ -408.8 DDEPTHcoxT,~ 
(22.1) (155.8) (186.8) (5.2) 
Adj - ~ ~ = 0 . 5 9  
where DDEPTHC~TT,~ is the depth of deal discount for Cottonelle in week t. 
Note that we did not include the depth of deal discount for White Cloud and 
Charmin since they were not significant As explained in simulation section, 
OLSR baseline for Northern can be computed by setting DDEPTHNoR,~ to be 
11) The same approach can be applied to the chain-wide data by using dummy variables for the in- 
tercept of each store. 
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zero for the entire period and replacing DDEPTHcoTT,~ by the expected 
depth of Cottonelle discount at week t. If Cottonelle makes an independent 
promotional decision relative to Northern, we may have to use the histori- 
cally observed depth of discount for DDEPTHcoTT,~ However, we should use 
the adjusted value of DDEPTHcoTT,~ if Cottonelle changes its promotional de- 
cision based on the promotional decision of Northern. 
To determine the interrelationship between Cottonelle's promotional ac- 
tivity and Northern's, simply correlating when the promotions occur does not 
prove informative because retailer's do not run promotions for two bra in 
the same week. To overcome this problem we counted the number of price 
deals for Cottonelle and Northern for each quarter as well as computed their 
average deal depth in order to see whether Cottonelle reacts to Northern in 
its promotional decisions. The following simple regressions show the positive 
reaction of Cottonelle to Northern in terms of both the frequency of the 
price deals and the average depth of these deals. 
FREQcoTT.~=O. 81 +0.62 FREQNoR.~ Adj - ~ ~ = 0 . 4 3  (5.3a) 
(0.59) (0.31) 
ADEPTHcoTT,~=O.O~+~. 33 ADEPTHNo-t ~ d j  -R~=o. 75 (5.3b) 
(0.05)(0.25) 
where FREQi,k is the frequency of temporary price reduction of brand i 
(i=Cottonelle, Northern) in quarter k and ADEPTHi,k is the average depth 
of discount of brand i in quarter k when the brand i is offered a price dis- 
count Clearly the promotion for Cottonelle and Northern are correlated. 
What causes each manufacturer to react to the other's promotional de- 
cision (e.g., temporary price reduction)? The answer is the lead time offered 
by the sales force to the buyers so that the buyers can "forward buy" when a 
promotion occurs. The sales force provides this information to avoid adverse 
reaction from the retailer's buyers. Because the buyer obtains this infor- 
mation in advance, they also communicate it to competitors in order to learn 
if they are planning similar promotions. Because of this communication, 
which occurs before the promotions are offered to the consumer, the manu- 
facturer learns of competitor's promotion and matches them because it is op- 
timal to avoid being in the off-diagonal cell in the "prisoners' dilemma". In 
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addition, a promotional schedule is usually set quarterly basis so that the 
weekly (buying) promotions are for the given quarter once the promotional 
schedule is made. 
The above reaction equations suggest that if Northern does not promote 
the quarterly frequency of Cottonelle's promotion is 0.81 and the average 
depth is only 0.01 when a promotion is offered In order to compute the 
OLSR baseline, which assumes that Northern does not promote, we use the 
weekly expected deal depth for Cottonelle (DDEPTHcoTT,~) which is 0.0007 
(0.81~0.01813). OLSR baseline of Northern is 246. 1 which is 15 percent 
higher than the OLS baseline given in equation (5.1) with DDEPTHNoR,~ set
equal to zero. This underestimation of OLS can be seen more clearly on Fig- 
ure 5 where OLS and OLSR baselines are plotted with the actual sales of 
Northern. OLS baseline is underestimated so that the incremental volume 
computed is overestimated. 
5.2 Baseline for R&zgerated Orange Juice 
There are three major national brands for refrigerated orange juice 
category: Tropicana, Minute Maid and Citrus Hill. We focus our attention on 
Tropicana, the market leader. The result of OLSL baseline estimation 
equation is 
where RPTROP,~ is the regular price of Tropicana in week t. We use OLSL 
in which the first lag of deal depth is included. Differing from the case of 
bathroom tissue, the equation has the sigmcant regular price coefficient. 
The OLSL baseline of Tropicana for week k can be determined by setting 
the value of deal depth at week t and t-1 to be zero and using the observed 
regular price at week t, which is 156.6 - 41.6 RPTROP,~ Notice the baseline 
changes weekly depending upon the regular price level for this product 
category. 
The OLSR baseline can similarly be determined except that sales of 
SEOUL JOURNAL OF BUSLNESS 
ales 
34 S E W L  JOURNAL OF BUSINESS 
Tropicana are related to the deal depth of other competitive brands as well 
as Tropicana The estimation result is written as 
STROP,~=~%~-E* 1 RPTROP,~+~.~DDEPTHTR~P,~-~~.~ DDEPTHTROP~L- I -70.4 DDEPTHylt 
( 523) (225) ( 20.9) (21.6) (21.5) 
Adj - ~ ~ = 0 . 5 1  (5.5) 
where DDEPTHMM,~ is the depth of deal discount for Minute Maid in week 
t. Note that we did not include the depth of deal discount for Citrus Hill 
since it was not signXcant. The next step is to calibrate the adjusted value 
of DDEPTHMM,~ which depends on whether Minute Maid reacts to the 
promotional decisions of Tropicana. The reaction equations for the quarterly 
frequency and the average deal depth are estimated as 
FREQ~~.k=3.01+0.52 FREQTRoP.~ ~ d j  -R'=o. 21 (5.6a) 
(1.44) (0.27) 
ADEPTHMM,~=O. 18i-0.60 ADEPTHTRoP.~ Adj -R'=o. 51 (5.6b) 
(0.10) (0.20) 
The above reaction equations suggest that the quarterly frequency of Min- 
ute Maid's promotion is 3.01 if Tropicana does not promote and the average 
depth when promoted is 0.18. Therefore, the weekly expected deal depth or 
the adjusted DDEPTHMM,~ is 0.04 (3.01 xO. 18+ 13). OLSR baseline of 
Tropicana is 135.8 - 25.1 RPTRoP,~. AS shown in figure 6, the OLSR baseline is 
always higher than the OLSL baseline. On average regular price of $2.39, 
for example, the OLSL baseline is 56.7 which is 35 percent lower than the 
OLSR baseline of 75.8. Again, the OLSL baseline, which does not incorpor- 
ate competitive reaction, is underestimated. 
5.3 Baseline for Frozen Orange Juice 
The third product category investigated is frozen orange juice which has 
Tropicana, Minute Maid and Citrus Hill as major national brands. We focus 
our attention on Tropicana, the market leader. The result of OLSL baseline 
estimation equation is 
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STRop,t=57. 94-413.5 DDEPTHTRoP,~ - 122- 8 DDEPTHTRoP,~ - 1 
( 8.7) ( 36.2) ( 36.2) (5.7) 
Adj - ~ ~ = 0 . 4 5  
Similar to the refrigerated orange juice, we use OLSL in which the first 
lag of deal depth is si-cant. However, the regular price is not significant 
so that it is not included in the regression. The OLSL baseline of Tropicana 
for week k is 57.9 when the value of deal depth at week t and t-1 is set to be 
zero in computing the baseline. 
The OLSR baseline was similarly be determined except that sales of 
Tropicana are related to the deal depth of other competitive brands as well 
as Tropicana. However, none of the deal depth of other competitor (Minute 
Maid and Citrus Hill) were significant, implying that the promotions of 
competitors do not influence the unit sales of Tropicana. This implies that 
the baseline of Tropicana stays the same whether other competitors react to 
the promotional decisions of Tropicana or notl2). In other words, OLSR base- 
line is the same as the OLSL baseline for this product category. 
V][. SUMMARY 
In this paper we have defined baseline sales and discussed its implica- 
tions, showing that the incorporation of competitive reaction fbnction is cru- 
cial to the measurement of the baseline. In addition, we discussed how a 
brand manager who manages a broad product line can use our estimation 
procedure of baseline sales to properly measure the incremental profitability 
of a brand's promotion. 
In a real market, it is not unusual to observe that each brand monitors 
and reacts to the promotions of other brands. As shown in the previous sec- 
tion, competitors react to the promotional decisions of the firm for all three 
product categories. When a firm increases the quarterly frequency of 
promotions, competitors will also increase their frequency. Moreover, this 
12) In fact, both Minute Maid and Citrus Hill positively react to Tropicana in terms of the frequency 
of deal discount However, they do not react in terms of the average of deal depth. 
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positive reaction among competitors is observed in terms of the depth of the 
deal discount. 
The importance of incorporating a competitor's reaction function is shown 
by a simulation in which several different baseline estimation methods are 
compared under various market conditions. In the simulation, we have 
shown that the competitive reaction f'unction is critical to accurately 
measuring the baseline. We have applied our concept of competitive reaction 
to real data and showed that the baseline results of incorporating competi- 
tive reaction into baseline estimation results in significantly different 
estimates than methods which do not incorporate the competitive reaction 
hnction. 
When setting promotions for a brand with key items which cannibalize 
other items within the brand or from other brands controlled by the firm, 
the baseline should be computed assuming that the promotions of 
cannibalizing items or brands in the product line are set equal to zero. 
Otherwise, the incremental profits from promotions will be too high and 
again the firm will misallocate resources. 
In summary, baseline estimation poses many interesting modeling and 
game theoretic issues. The art and science of baseline estimation is in its in- 
fancy and we hope this paper will help other researchers working on this 
problem. For real-world practitioners, this paper has identified issues 
associated with the case of baselines and has emphasized the importance of 
understanding the assumptions underlying baseline estimation and the po- 
tential pitfalls of not recognizing potential biases in the baselines currently 
being estimated. 
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